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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF FEDERAL AND
STATE TESTIMONIAL IMMUNITY LEGISLATION
Introduction
The privilege against self-incrimination is embodied in
both the United States Constitution1 and the Louisiana Constitution. 2 Utilization of the right often thwarts investigation
of other criminal activities of which the claimant may have
knowledge, but prosecutors have long realized that justice
might best be served by throwing back the little fish in order
to catch the bigger ones. Thus, the principle developed that
an individual could be compelled to give testimony incriminating himself if he were granted immunity. 3 To be effective as a quid pro quo for compelled testimony, the scope of
the immunity granted must be coextensive with the privilege
4
against self-incrimination.
Two basic types of immunity are employed in attempts to
protect a witness's privilege against self-incrimination.
Transactional immunity 5 precludes all prosecution relating to
the subject matter of the compelled testimony. "Use plus
derivative use" immunity allows prosecution of a witness who
was compelled to testify, but prohibits introduction of his
compelled testimony in any future prosecutions. Since "useplus" does not confer amnesty, when it is granted the protection afforded the witness must be scrutinized carefully to
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

2. LA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
3. For detailed analysis of the historical development of the immunity
concept see Comment, Texas Immunity Law: A Survey and a Proposal, 10

HOUSTON L. REV. 1120 (1973); Note, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 109 (1972); Comment,
Immunity from Prosecution: Transaction versus Testimonial or Use, 17

S.D.L.REV. 166 (1972); Note, 24 VAND. L. REV. 815 (1971); Note, Standardsfor
Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171

(1972) [hereinafter cited as YALE NOTE].
4 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892).
5. Transactional immunity is, under the federal legislation, virtually
nonexistent. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, § 802, which provided for transactional immunity, was repealed by 18'
U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1970) effective October 15, 1974. There was a four-year
delay in repeal apparently to allow the Supreme Court to determine the
validity of §§ 6001-6005. See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4017-18 (1970).
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insure that it adequately compensates him for surrender of
his constitutional rights.6
Federal Immunity Legislation
Constitutionality of the Statute on its Face
Title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of 19707 provides that
no testimony or other information compelled under the
[court immunity] order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case... 8
and confers "use-plus" immunity.9 The chief constitutional
consideration is whether the statute's language affords a
witness protection coextensive with that granted by his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In Kastigar
v. United States,1 0 the United States Supreme Court held the
immunity statute constitutional on its face and declared that
the statute's protection is as broad as that of the fifth
amendment because the compelled testimony cannot be used
by any prosecutor "in any respect."11
The primary argument advanced against the "use-plus"
statute is that, as a practical matter, determination of
whether the compelled testimony was indirectly used is impossible. 12 To mitigate the problem, the Kastigar Court imposed an affirmative duty on future prosecutors to prove that
the evidence they propose to use is derived from a legitimate
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. 13 The
Court emphasized that the heavy burden is not limited to a
6. A third type of immunity, "pure use," prohibits introduction of the
testimony actually compelled. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892),
held this variety not coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege. Some
statutes nevertheless provide for this type of immunity as gratis. See United
States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969
(1973).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
9. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Kastigar].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 453.
12. See Kastigar, J. Marshall dissenting at 469; YALE NOTE at 181.
13. Kastigar at 460.
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negation of taint, but must be affirmatively demonstrated. 14
Analogizing the rule excluding coerced confessions to the requisite scope of protection in immunity statutes, the Court
reasoned that since a person's fifth amendment right is protected only if a coerced confession is not used to incriminate
him, compelled testimony should likewise be excluded. 15 In
Harrisonv. United States,'6 the Court excluded the fruits of a
coerced confession. 17 By proscribing "derivative use" of compelled testimony, the Act provides the additional protection
called for by Harrison. A coerced confession does not bar
subsequent prosecution; the coercion merely keeps the confession from being used against the person. 18 Since the fifth
amendment requires no more than that the coerced confession and its fruits be excluded, immunity statutes need not
confer transactional immunity, which is tantamount to amnesty, to be constitutionally sound.
Finally, the Kastigartheory is supported by the presumption that public officials perform their duties in the manner
prescribed by law.' 9 If future prosecutors are presumed to
abide by the use limitation, a statute granting "use plus"
immunity is, on its face, coextensive with the privilege
against self-incrimination.
Mechanics of the Immunity Grant
While the courts have upheld the constitutional validity
of the statutory language of the Act, various courts have
addressed the mechanics of the statute and its constitutionality as applied. Title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 repealed prior legislation in favor of a central scheme
regulating grants of immunity. The legislation allows grants
of immunity in proceedings before or ancillary to a court or
14. Id.
15. Id. at 461-62.
16. 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
17. The Court used the fourth amendment "taint" analysis of Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The analogy is criticized in YALE NOTE
at 171 because different policy considerations govern exclusion of evidence
illegally seized and exclusion of coerced confessions.
18. United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 884 (1972) (exclusion of testimony compelled at a motion to suppress
hearing deemed adequate protection of defendant's fifth amendment rights).
19. Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1972) and cases
cited therein. For exhaustive treatment of the presumption, see Lurie v.
Florida St. Bd. of Dentistry, 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1973).
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grand jury of the United States, 20 an agency of the United
States, 21 either House of Congress, a joint committee, or a
committee of either House. 22 The statute provides the same
scope of immunity regardless of which body seeks to compel
23
testimony, but procedures for obtaining immunity vary.
In all cases, only a court may order testimony pursuant
to immunity granted by that court. The court's function in
granting the immunity is primarily ministerial;2 it has no
discretion in granting, rejecting, or modifying a grant, but
serves only as a "checkpoint for assuring proper compliance
'25
with the established procedures.
The federal statute requires that immunity be granted
only when a witness refuses to testify or is likely to refuse to
testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
The requirement safeguards prosecutors, precluding automatic grants of immunity to all persons who testify when
requested to do so. 26 If the witness does not claim his fifth
amendment privilege, immunity is not required; 27 moreover, if
the privilege is frivolously asserted, a grant is not needed.2
Determination of whether the privilege has been properly
claimed is one function of the judiciary in reviewing the order.

29

20. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 6004 (1970).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1970).
23. A wealth of case law interpreting the mechanics of granting immunity has developed. The general tenet followed in these decisions is aptly
expressed in United States v. Dunham Concrete Prod., Inc., 475 F.2d 1241 (5th
Cir. 1973), where the court reasoned that immunity statutes are designed to
strengthen law enforcement, not to hinder it, and the statutes should be
construed to effectuate this purpose.
24. Urasaki v. United States, 504 F.2d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1974). Application
of United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities,
361 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (D.D.C. 1973) [hereinafter cited as App. of U.S.
Senate].
25. App. of U.S. Senate at 1278. These procedures include constitutional
considerations as well as the prerequisite formalities enumerated in the
statute. For succinct analysis of the latter see In re Di Bella, 499 F.2d 1175
(2d Cir. 1974).
26. See Comment, Automatic Witness Immunity Statutes, 55 GEO. L.J.
(1967).
27. Immunity can be granted if the defendant is likely to refuse to testify. See United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974).
28. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey Invest. Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 480 (1972).
29. App. of U.S. Senate at 1278. Another function is to adequately advise
the defendant of the scope of immunity protection. In re Persico, 491 F.2d
1156 (2d Cir. 1974).
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As noted in Application of the United States Senate
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 30 another area

appropriate for judicial inquiry is the subject matter of the
investigation, as distinguished from the subject matter of the
testimony, which should not be questioned by the court. The
court should determine whether the body seeking the immu-

nity grant has jurisdiction over the matter under investigation or with which it is otherwise concerned. If the matter is
properly before that investigating body, the court infringes
on the body's power by ruling on whether a witness's tes31
timony is relevant to the inquiry.
The provisions concerning grand jury, court, and ad-

ministrative proceedings require a determination that the
witness's testimony "may be necessary to the public interest"
before immunity is granted.3 2 Three cases have made the
requirement almost meaningless by stating that the reviewing court has no discretion to determine whether a request
33
for immunity actually meets the requirement.
Finally, the statute covers "any witness" summoned to
testify, even if that person is a potential defendant in the
subject matter of the investigation. 34 However, immunity
supplants only the claim of privilege against selfincrimination, and a witness with another testimonial
privilege might still refuse to testify. 35 Numerous types of
30. 361 F. Supp. 1270 (D.D.C. 1973).
31. Contra, 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON THE REFORM
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 1442 (1970). The writer submits that the court
need not determine relevance of the subject matter of the testimony because
the more the witness talks, the broader is his protection. Significantly, In re
Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973), declared that even the immunized witness
is not entitled to be informed of the subject matter of the grand jury investigation before which he is being compelled to testify. 18 U.S.C. § 6001 (1970) is
not limited in subject matter as were former statutes, but rather covers "any
proceeding" brought before the respective body. Beverly v. United States,
468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1972). The fact that the statutes are part of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 does not limit their applicability to
investigations of organized crime. In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1218 (4th Cir.
1973).
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6003-04 (1970).
33. In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215,
1218-19 (4th Cir. 1973) and cases cited therein; In re Baldinger, 356 F. Supp.
153 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
34. Goldberg v. United States, 472 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1973).
35. Tierney v. United States, 409 U.S. 1232 (1972) (claim of attorney-client
privilege constituted justification for refusal). However, refusal to answer
absent another privilege, often a valid immunity grant, is grounds for a trial
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privilege claims have been asserted despite a grant of immunity, including husband-wife, 36 fear of underworld reprisals, 37
and first amendment arguments, 38 but to date, only claims
39
based on attorney-client privilege have been sustained.
Constitutionality of the Act as Applied
Whenever a grant of immunity is conferred, the witness
generally has two broad grounds for attack: that his constitutional rights have not been adequately safeguarded or that
the grant does not conform with the terms of the statute. Any
challenge must come from the immunized witness himself, as
no other party has standing to attack the grant. 40 Although
the statute provides no procedure whereby a witness can
contest an immunity order and seems to require an ex parte
order, two cases hold that a witness who objects to giving
testimony despite a grant of immunity is entitled to a hearing
41
preceded by adequate notice.
A witness compelled to testify under an immunity grant
often demands representation by counsel during the compelled testimony. His sixth amendment right to representation by counsel should still exist since only his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been eliminated. Problems arise when the immunized witness appears
before a grand jury, where attorneys cannot be present. Although one case 42 left open the question of the extent of the
right to counsel in grand jury proceedings, a witness has no
need for counsel once he is immunized. Nothing the witness
says can be used in any manner by a prosecutor in an action
against the witness; therefore, an attorney's advice as to
whether to answer questions is unnecessary. The witness
court to immediately hold the witness in contempt. United States v. Wilson,
420 U.S. 332 (1975).
36. United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v.
Taulbee, 476 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1973).
37. Latona v. United States, 449 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1971).
38. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972); United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1971).
39. United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v.
Taulbee, 476 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1973).
40. United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974) and cases cited
therein; United States v. Lewis, 456 F.2d 404, 409 (3d Cir. 1972) and cases
cited therein.
41. United States v. Taulbee, 476 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d (9th Cir. 1971).
42. In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
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must answer, but the more information he divulges, the more
difficult it becomes for future prosecutors to demonstrate an
independent source of evidence.
Another argument employed in challenging orders to testify based upon immunity grants is that the witness fears
future prosecution utilizing his compelled testimony in either
federal or state forums. While the federal statute does not
expressly prohibit a state prosecutor from using testimony
obtained through a federal grant of immunity, Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission3 held that such a prohibition is a
constitutional requirement. 44 Moreover, the statute arguably
precludes state use of the testimony by proscribing its use "in
any criminal case. '45 Therefore, any fear of state or federal
prosecutors utilizing the compelled testimony is unwarranted. On the other hand, several cases deal with fear of
possible prosecution in another country based upon testimony given in a United States federal court. 46 Zicarelli v.
New Jersey Investigation Commission47 dealt with a state
immunity statute, but the defendant raised the foreign prosecution issue. The Court avoided deciding the issue by noting
that the fear in that case was not "real and substantial."'
The issue was decided in In re Cardassi4 9 where the court's
initial inquiry was whether a reasonable fear of future
foreign prosecution existed, implying that if it does, the fifth
amendment protects the witness from compelled disclosure of
information which would incriminate him in another country.
Thus, under Cardassione might refuse to testify even after a
grant of immunity if the fear of foreign prosecution is
reasonable, although such prosecution is not imminent. 50
43. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
44. Accord, United States v. Armstrong, 476 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Seavers, 472 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1973).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) (emphasis added). A similar immunity provision, now 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (1970), contained the language "in any criminal
proceeding" and was ruled binding on the states under the commerce and
necessary and proper clauses in Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960).
46. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472 (1972);
United States v. Doe, 361 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1973); In re Cardassi, 351 F.
Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
47. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
48. Id. at 478.
49. 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
50. Id. at 1085. A similar conclusion is reached in United States v. Doe,
361 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd, 364 F. Supp. 1385, aff'd without written
opinion, 485 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Cardassi further noted that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which precludes disclosure of grand jury occurrences, relies on the good faith of public officials, which is
insufficient protection to exchange for a defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. 5 ' To the contrary, United States v.
Armstrong,52 and In re Weir 53 opine that the secrecy of the
grand jury proceedings is a sufficient safeguard against any
danger of foreign prosecution. 54 The question remains unresolved, but the Cardassi position seems more sound, particularly since rule 6(e) is subject to judicial exception. 55
Harrisv. New York, 56 which allows impeachment use of a
confession obtained without proper Miranda warnings,
creates another problem related to immunity grants: whether
testimony of an immunized witness can later be used to impeach him.5 7 Few courts have ruled definitively on the issue.5 8
Kastigar analogized compelled testimony to coerced confessions, not to confessions infirm by Miranda guidelines. In re
Tierney 59 failed to decide whether compelled testimony could
be used to impeach, but held sub silentio that the mere possibility of use for impeachment is not sufficient grounds to
refuse to testify after a grant of immunity. However, the
Third Circuit in United States v. Hockenberry60 distinguished
Harris as setting the line for protection of Miranda procedural rights, noting that 18 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq. confer
immunity from any use of the testimony. The use of immunized testimony to impeach would erode fifth amendment
6
protection and was thus ruled impermissible. 1
A heated debate exists over the desirability of making
exception to the "forbidden use" rule in prosecutions for "perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
51. 351 F. Supp. at 1082. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (e) establishes the obligation
of secrecy regarding almost all matters before federal grand juries.
52. 476 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1973).
53. 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974).
54. Accord, In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972). See In re Parker,
411 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (10th Cir. 1969).
55. See, e.g., In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154 (D.R.I. 1972).
56. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
57. YALE NOTE at 176.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38 n.5 (2d Cir. 1973) which
specifically left the issue open.
59. 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
60. 474 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1973).
61. Id. at 250.
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with the order. '6 2 Such an exception, some witnesses claim,
allows use of the compelled testimony to incriminate the witness and thus should preclude compulsion of testimony because the grant of immunity is not coextensive with the forfeited privilege against self-incrimination. The lone champion
63
of their cause is In re Baldinger,
in which a federal district
court held 18 U.S.C. § 6002 unconstitutional as applied since it
would allow the witness's compelled testimony to be used in a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for false statements made to
F.B.I. agents prior to the grant of immunity. The court interpreted the false statement exception as not limited to statements made during the course of the compelled grand jury
testimony, and thus not coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege.6 4 The correctness of the decision is questionable. Statutes should be interpreted to uphold their constitutionality, 5 and the exception could have been interpreted as
encompassing only false statements made during or after the
compelled testimony. The weight of opinion is that Baldinger's expansive interpretation is erroneous.6 6 Two decisions
held that allowing use of compelled testimony for prosecution
for perjury is constitutional, but failed to assign reasons for
so holding.6 7 The fifth amendment simply prohibits a person
from being forced to testify to facts which prove he committed
a crime; its protection does not extend to statements made by
the person which are in themselves criminal. The immunized
witness is forced to testify and ordered to speak the truth;
statements he makes cannot be used to prove he previously
committed a crime, but can be used to show the fact of utterance which constitutes a new crime, such as perjury or false
statement. One court recently declared that in exchange for
his testimony, the immunized witness is
62. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). See Note, Statutory Immunity and the Perjury
Exception, 10 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 428 (1974).
63. 356 F. Supp. 153 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
64. 356 F. Supp. at 162.
65. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971).
66. United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hockenberry, 474 F.2d.247 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Bottari, 453 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.
1972); United States v. Doe, 361 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Penn. 1973), affd, 485 F.2d
682 (3d Cir. 1973); App. of U.S. Senate at 1283. The issue was left open in
United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38 n.5 (2d Cir. 1973). Moreover, the statute
upheld in Kastigar contained the perjury exception; see United States v.
Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, (2d Cir. 1974).
67. United States v. Hockenberry, 474 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1973); In re
Bottari, 453 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1972).
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promised that he will not be prosecuted based on the
inculpatory evidence he gives in exchange. However, the
bargain struck is conditional upon the witness who is
under oath telling the truth. If he gives false testimony,
68
it is not compelled at all.
Future Prosecution of the Immunized Witness
As discussed previously, Kastigar announced that an immunized witness is protected by barring any use of his compelled testimony. The witness may still be prosecuted for
offenses related to the subject matter of the testimony, but
the prosecutor must affirmatively show that his evidence did
not directly or indirectly emanate from the compelled testimony. The determination often takes place at a pretrial
evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress. 69 The issue
being whether the evidence the government will use in the
prosecution is tainted by the compelled testimony, a necessary inquiry is what constitutes forbidden use and how the
government proves an independent legitimate source.
Regarding "forbidden use," Kastigar explained that
"use-plus" immunity creates a "total prohibition on use ...
[which includes use as] an 'investigatory lead' and also ban[s]
the use of any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on
a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures. ' 70 Thus, the
prohibition extends beyond introduction of the compelled testimony itself, and includes use in focusing the investigation,
in deciding whether to initiate prosecution, in refusing to plea
68. United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1342 (2d Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
69. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966) declared that evidence
derived in violation of a defendant's fifth amendment rights should be
excluded, but that quashing the indictment was unnecessary. If the Kastigar
comparison with forced confessions is continued, Blue would seem controlling. The majority view seems to be that a pre-trial motion to suppress or
evidentiary hearing is the best approach. See United States v. First Western
State Bank, 491 F.2d 780, 786 (8th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as First
Western]; United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Seiffert, 357 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Tex. 1973). Contra, United States v.
Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), but see reversal, 491 F.2d 473
(2d Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Thanasouras, 368 F. Supp. 534 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); United States v. Dornau, 356 F. Supp. 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). One
court showed dissatisfaction with either routine and stated that the government must show "independent source" during the course of the trial. United
States v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (D.N.J. 1973).
70. Kastigar at 460.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

bargain, in interpreting evidence, in planning cross71
examination, and in preparing general trial strategy.
In the analogous problem of coerced confessions, all fruits
72
derived from such confessions are excluded from the trial.
While exclusion alone is not the extent of the protection
called for by Kastigar, the analysis utilized for determining
"taint" where a coerced confession is involved should be
applicable in immunity cases. 73 United States v. Seiffert,74 an
immunity case, in holding fourth and fifth amendment
"taint" cases applicable, announced the inquiry to be
whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which the instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
75
purged of the primary taint.
In immunity cases and in cases involving coerced confessions,
introduction of testimony obtained in derogation of a defendant's fifth amendment rights constitutes a violation of those
rights. Introduction of illegally seized evidence does not violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights; the illegal
seizure violates the right.76 Such distinction notwithstanding,
the analysis originating in fourth amendment "taint" cases
rests upon the same inquiry used in "use-plus" immunity
cases: whether the proposed evidence is derived from a
legitimate independent source.
The government must meet a stringent burden to prove
an independent and legitimate source for its evidence. Kastigar announced the test:
[T]he federal authorities have the burden of showing that
their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they
had an independent legitimate source for the disputed
evidence. This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as ap71. -United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973); Goldberg
v. United States, 472 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1973).
72. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
73. See generally YALE NOTE at 176-80.
74. 357 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Tex. 1973). Cf. United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d
38 (2d Cir. 1973).
75. 357 F. Supp. at 806, citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487-88 (1963).
76. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). To implement the right, Mapp made
the exclusionary rule applicable to the states.
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propriate, is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it
imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove
that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
77
testimony.
Exactly how the burden is discharged is unsettled. In Lego v.
Twomey, 78 the United States Supreme Court stated that the
government is required to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that a confession is voluntary. 79 If the coerced confession test is carried over into the field of immunity, a recognizable quantum of proof can be established for discharging
the affirmative duty of proving independent source. The preponderance of the evidence test is utilized in United States v.
Seiffert. s0 However, once the preponderance test is deemed
appropriate, problems arise in applying the test to various
situations.
Several courts have implied that a greater standard of
proof exists if the sovereign which granted immunity is the
same sovereign wishing to prosecute,"' distinguishing the
situation where a separate sovereign seeks to prosecute following compelled testimony in another jurisdiction. 82 Other
courts have approached the problem on what seems to be an
ad hoc basis. In United States v. First Western,s3 the government discharged its burden by proving it had no access to
state grand jury testimony, by introducing testimony that
the government had no knowledge of compelled testimony,
and by introducing F.B.I. and grand jury reports as independent sources. United States v. Seiffert8 4 held that a prosecutor's statements merely denying use of the compelled testimony are insufficient, and that a demonstration of the
source of all evidence presented is required. On remand, the
trial court held that testimony and cross-examination of all
77. Kastigar at 460. See generally Note, 58 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1972); YALE
NOTE at 171.
78. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
79. Id. at 489.
80. 357 F. Supp. 801, 804 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (rejected the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard). The same suggestion is made in Note, 58 VA. L. REV.
1099, 1115 (1972).
81. United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971); First Western
at 783. See also Note, 17 VILL. L. REV. 559, 565 (1972).
82. Cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
83. 491 F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1974).
84. 463 F.2d 1089, 1092 (5th Cir. 1972).
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government investigators can discharge the burden.8 5 Other
cases have declared that an affidavit by the government attesting "non-use" is insufficient 86 but that an F.B.I. report
made prior to the time the witness is compelled to testify is
sufficient. s 7 From the hodge-podge of jurisprudence, a rule
can be gleaned: the trial court must satisfy itself that the
facts indicate that the witness's compelled testimony was not
used by the prosecution. The problem which prompted Justice
Marshall's dissent in Kastigar, that the witness's rights are
contingent on the good faith of the prosecutor, can be diminished significantly by intense judicial scrutiny and zealous cross-examination by defense counsel.
The courts have developed several methods to insure
compliance with their "use-plus" immunity orders. In re Minkoff8 8 ruled that a witness has the right to a copy of his grand
jury testimony to facilitate protection of his privilege against
self-incrimination. The practice was followed in United States
v. Dornau,89 but was rejected in In re Bottari,90 which held
that the witness's demand that he be given a copy as a precondition to testifying was premature, and such a demand is
proper only if he is subsequently prosecuted. The case is
correct so long as the transcript is made available when properly requested, since the secrecy of the grand jury is thereby
maintained.
Courts have formulated other safeguards bearing upon
tainted evidence and affirmative proof of nonuse. Some have
held that when an immunized witness testifies before a grand
jury, a separate body of grand jurors should consider whether
to indict the immunized witness, as the witness's testimony
cannot be erased from the first jurors' minds.9 1 Other courts
require that a prosecutor who has not had access to compelled testimony prosecute the cases, even though another
92
prosecutor in the same office has read the testimony,
eliminating the possibility that the prosecutor will use the
85. United States v. Seiffert, 357 F. Supp. 801, 809 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
86. In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154, 157 (D.R.I. 1972).
87. United States v. McDaniel, 352 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.D. 1972).
88. 349 F. Supp. 154, 157 (D.R.I. 1972).
89. 356 F. Supp. 1091, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
90. 453 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1972).
91. Goldberg v. United States, 472 F.2d 513, 516 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf. Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
92. United States v. Dornau, 491 F.2d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 1974) and cases
cited therein..
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testimony in some subtle or unconscious way.9 3 Such an approach is better than one calling for non-prosecution if any
prosecutor has read the testimony. One writer's 94 suggestion
that the government seal and certify its evidence against a
witness before compelling him to testify is cited with approval
95
in Goldberg v. United States.
One problem which has recently arisen concerns whether
the judge must give jury instructions regarding the probative
value and weight to be given immunized testimony. United
States v.Leonard96 held that failure to caution the jury that
testimony of an immunized witness must be received with
circumspection is reversible error. Leonard relied on an earlier United States Supreme Court decision, On Lee,9 7 which
had held that cautionary instructions are required when paid
informers testify, because such persons are of a genus whose
testimony is suspect. The analogy is wisely carried over to
testimony of immunized witnesses.
Louisiana Immunity Legislation
In 1972, the Louisiana Legislature amended the Code of
Criminal Procedure to include article 439.1, which allows immunity grants for "any individual . . . called to testify ...
before ...a grand jury .... a court,... or in response to any
subpoena by the attorney general or district attorney ....
Section (A) of article 439.1 makes it mandatory that the judge
in the district where the proceeding is held issue an order
compelling a witness to testify or provide other information 99
if three prerequisites are met: (1) the request must be made
by both the attorney general and the district attorney, 0 0 (2)
the information or testimony compelled must be necessary to
the public interest, 10 ' and (3) the individual must have refused or be likely to refuse to give such testimony or information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 0 2
93. United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
94. YALE NOTE at 181-88. See also Note, 58 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1116 (1972).
95. 472 F.2d 513, 516 n.5 (2d Cir. 1973).
96. 494 F.2d 955 (D.D.C. 1974).
97. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
98. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.1(A) (Supp. 1974).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.1(B)(1) (Supp. 1972).
102. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.1(B)(2) (Supp. 1972).
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The third requirement precludes inadvertent automatic immunity to anyone who testifies. The party must claim his
privilege to trigger operation of article 439.1; otherwise, the
testimony is not "compelled" as contemplated by the privilege
against self-incrimination. 10 3
The crucial part of the statute is found at section 439.1(C):
The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, but
no testimony or other information compelled under the
order, or any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony or other information, may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.
The language creates several dubieties, the most important
of which concerns the nature of the immunity established.
The section clearly creates "use-plus" immunity but may go
further and create transactional immunity. The problem is in
the language: "no testimony or other information compelled
under the order, or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information, may be
used against the witness."' 1 4 The underscored phrase might
indicate that no information can be introduced against that
witness at a future trial, an interpretation tantamount to a
grant of amnesty. However, that interpretation is undermined by an overview of the legislation. The order permitted
by article 439.1(A) is not limited to testimony but allows the
court to order the witness to "provide other information
which he refuses to give or provide."' 0 5 Hence, the preclusion
of article 439.1(C) encompasses only "other information" produced by compulsion, such as documents obtained by subpoena
duces tecum, 0 6 and does not set up an absolute bar against
introduction of any evidence against the witness in a future
criminal case.
The most logical interpretation of the Louisiana statute
is that it exchanges "use-plus" immunity for the fifth
103. State v. Wallace, Nos. 55-661, 55-662 (La. S.Ct., on rehearing Nov. 4,
1975). See also State v. Nattin, 316 So. 2d 115 (La. 1975) (if defendant voluntarily waives fifth amendment privileges, he does not testify under compulsion.)
104. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.1(C) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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amendment right; therefore, future prosecutions would not
be barred. The Kastigar requirement that the government
demonstrate that its evidence is independent of the compelled
testimony thus becomes extremely important because it was
discussed as a matter of fundamental fairness and grounded
in constitutional considerations.10 7 Consequently, if the immunizing state district attorney seeks to prosecute the witness who has been compelled to testify, he must reckon with
independent source consideration.' 0 8
Whether article 439.1 provides "use-plus" or transactional immunity, the effect of the grant on federal and other
state prosecution is the same. Either type of immunity bars
both sovereigns from the use of the testimony or any fruits
derived therefrom. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission'l 9 dealt
with a state grant of transactional immunity and held that
the federal government was prohibited from making any use
of the compelled testimony or its fruits. Murphy made it clear
that the supremacy clause precludes the states from absolutely banning a federal investigation by a grant of immunity."l0 However, a state can place an onerous burden on
future federal prosecution because of the "independent
should apply to fusource" requirement."' The same theory
2
ture prosecution in another state."
Although article 439.1(C) provides that after the grant of
immunity a witness cannot refuse to testify "on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination," he might still refuse
to answer questions or provide information on the basis of
107. Kastigar at 453.
108. The independent source problems with the federal statute discussed
in text at notes 70-96, supra, should be similar under the state statute.
Since the state statute is identical to the federal statute in all essential
elements, the federal cases will serve as at least persuasive authority. See
generally State v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958).
109. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
110. Id. at 71.
111. A witness compelled by the state to testify under an immunity grant
can simply allege that the federal prosecutor has access to and used the
witness's state testimony. The federal prosecutor would then presumably be
forced to prove an independent source or disprove use of state testimony.
The reverse situation existed in State v. Wallace, Nos. 55-661, 55-662 (La.
S.Ct., on rehearing Nov. 4, 1975), in which the state used testimony given
before a federal grand jury.
112. Significantly, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted in an early decision, State ex rel. Doran v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So. 2d 894 (1949), that the
privilege against self-incrimination was validly raised for fear of prosecution
in another state.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

230

[Vol. 36

one of Louisiana's many testimonial privileges arising from
special relationships. 1 1 3 In Tierney v. United States, 1 4 the
United States Supreme Court stated,
The fact remains . . . that the 'leads' obtained from testimony given after [the] "use" immunity has been
granted can be used to indict and convict the applicants...
therefore . . .the attorney-client privilege does continue .... 115
The court hints that a different result might be obtained
under a transactional immunity statute because all future
prosecution is proscribed. In fact, one case interpreting the
old federal transactional immunity statute refused to allow
the claim of the husband-wife privilege. 11 6 The analysis upon
which the result is grounded is confusing and its validity is
questionable. The problem arises from a blurring of the underlying bases of the two privileges. Husband-wife and
attorney-client privileges protect relationships; immunity
protects the privilege against self-incrimination. The two varieties of privilege should not be equated. While the result of
successfully claiming either is exclusion of relevant evidence,
the underlying principles are vastly different and not interchangeable. Thus, privileges based on special relationships
should be allowed whether the immunity granted is "useplus" or transactional.
Another problem with the Louisiana statute deserves attention. The provision states that the compelled testimony
can in no way be used "except [in] a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement or otherwise failing to comply with
the order."" 7 As previously discussed, the federal provision
has a similar exception which has been subject to conflicting
interpretations,1 " although the jurisprudential trend seems
to be to interpret the statute as allowing use only in future
trials for perjury committed or false statements given while
immunized. 1 9
The constitutionality of article 439.1 might be questioned
113. G. PUGH, LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 151-90 (1974). Compare the

analysis
supra.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

of the same problem under the federal statute in text at notes 36-39,
409 U.S. 1232 (1972).
Id. at 1233.
United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1973).
LA. CODE CRIM. P. 439.1(C) (Supp. 1972).
See analysis of Baldinger problem in text at notes 63-68, supra.
See cases in note 67, supra.
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under the 1974 Louisiana constitution. The rationale underlying immunity grants is that the immunized witness does
not really lose his privilege against self-incrimination. He
does not provide evidence which can incriminate him since
the compelled testimony cannot be used against him in any
way by any jurisdiction, i.e., immunity is the quid pro quo for
relinquishment of the privilege against self-incrimination.
While article 1, section 16 of the 1974 Louisiana constitution
provides that "no person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself," and would thus be compatible with the prior
discussion of immunity, article 1, section 13 in the "Rights of
the Accused" section states that "[a] person . . .arrested or
detained . . .shall be advised fully of ... his right to remain

silent, [and] his right against self-incrimination.' 120 The Federal Constitution confers no right to remain silent,'12 1 nor was
there a state right of that nature under the 1921 Louisiana
constitution. The new constitution may create such a right
for persons accused, and if it does, a grant of immunity is not
coextensive with the right to remain silent. Such an interpretation would eviscerate article 439.1 because its primary use
is to compel accused criminals to testify against cohorts in
crime. The better interpretation of article 1, section 13 is that
the provision requires only that a person be advised of his
Miranda rights, and that once trial begins, article 1, section
13 is supplanted by the article 1, section 16 privilege against
self-incrimination.
A related issue is raised in State v. Soukup, 122 in which a
conviction was reversed because the state's witness, while
being cross-examined by the defendant, repeatedly claimed
the privilege against self-incrimination and thereby prevented effective cross-examination. The authors of a recent
article state:
Today's answer to such a quandary on the part of the
prosecution would presumably be for the state either not
to call the witness, or under the authority of Louisiana's
recently adopted compelled testimony statute [CODE
CRIM. P. article 439.1] to require him to testify fully and
23
thus deny itself future use of such testimony.'
120. LA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (emphasis added).
121. See generally Note, 51 ORE. L. REV.573 (1972). But see Clutchette v.
Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
122. 275 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973).
123. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 449 (1974).
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Faced with a similar problem in federal court, United States
v. DeSena 124 specifically left open the question of whether a
defendant could compel the government to grant immunity to
an essential defense witness.
Louisiana's statute follows the federal immunity statute
in all essential elements. Thus, the plethora of federal cases
should provide guidelines for interpretation of problem areas
125
in Louisiana's legislation.
James E. Boren
124. 490 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1973).
125. The general rule of statutory construction is that the adoption of a
statute of the federal government or of another state includes all the previous authoritative interpretations and constructions of that statute. See, e.g.,
State v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v.
Collector of Revenue, 210 La. 428, 27 So. 2d 268 (1946).

